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Heroism as Moral Paradox

While heroes and heroines abound in mythology and literature, it was not
until 1958 that the question of the ethical status of heroism was raised. J.O.
Urmson’s seminal article “Saints and Heroes” criticized traditional ethical theory,
arguing that the usual tripartite classification of actions, viz. forbidden,
permitted, required, could not do justice to the moral excellence of heroic and
saintly actions: To my mind this threefold classification…is totally inadequate to

the facts of morality; any moral theory that leaves room only for such a
classification will in consequence also be inadequate.
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Post-Urmson discussion

has placed heroism into a class of actions labeled as supererogation, even
though Urmson himself did not use the term. Broadly defined, supererogatory
actions are morally excellent actions that go beyond the duty of the agent. This
working definition is, as one would expect, not a matter of agreement; the
refined definition of an individual theorist will follow along with his view on other
related ideas, e.g. how to define ‘duty’, whether altruism is possible, or whether
or not this class of actions even exists. David Heyd’s Supererogation, Its Status
in Ethical Theory (1982), arguably the most complete analysis of this ethical
concept, identified six paradigm instances of supererogatory actions, with moral
heroism considered the most typical. 2The purpose of this essay is to reflect on
the introduction of heroism into ethical theory via the concept of supererogation,
with a view to deciding how plausibly the theory of heroism fits the facts, i.e.
1

basic intuitions about heroism.

I have been guided by Heyd’s definition of

supererogation: An act is supererogatory if and only if:

a. It is neither obligatory nor forbidden.
b. Its omission is not wrong, and does not deserve sanction or
criticism—either formal or informal.
c. It is morally good, both by virtue of its (intended) consequences
and by virtue of its intrinsic value (being beyond duty).
d. It is done voluntarily for the sake of someone else’s good, and
is thus meritorious. 3
`

Imagine a squad of soldiers, as J.O. Urmson would have us do: We

may imagine a squad of soldiers to be practicing the throwing of live hand
grenades; a grenade slips from the hand of one of them and rolls on the ground
near the squad; one of them sacrifices his life by throwing himself on the
grenade and protecting his comrades with his own body. 4 Let us assume, in this
example, that the soldier had the best of motives and that he was neither
suicidal nor deranged. There was nothing in his character or personality that
even the most suspicious and cynical observer might find to criticize. Let us
agree with Urmson, then, that he is a hero, that his action was heroic. Despite
the flexibility of the word heroic and thus its ambiguity, it is still an appropriate
word with which to refer to an action that is morally relevant or has some moral
character, whether because of the good consequences that it achieves, or
because of the strength of the agent’s character or virtue, of which it is an
expression, or because of the good will that motivates the action.
Selecting an example of the heroic is not as straightforward as one initially
may think, and the fact that the words hero and heroic are so commonly used to
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refer to a variety of praiseworthy people and actions, whether saints or
quarterbacks, does nothing to uncomplicate an analysis. The great extension of
the term makes it ambiguous, and precision is hard to achieve. Achilles and
Ulysses were Homeric heroes, and Socrates was the first moral hero. Joseph
Campbell made the hero of the monomyth a staple of literary and cultural
studies. Albert Schweitzer and Mahatma Gandhi were living heroes. In 1941
Maximilian Kolbe volunteered to replace another Auschwitz prisoner headed for
the gas chamber and died there himself. Dorothy Day was committed to the
service of the poor. Many people would offer the name of Mother Theresa of
Calcutta as an example of the heroic. While we have to allow the possibility that
none of these is perfect and that there will be something to criticize, each is a
plausible hero/heroine. The prospect of selecting a person as hero/heroine is
daunting, precisely because the observer would have to consider the total
character and moral excellence of such a hero/heroine, an overall life rather than
a discrete action. One would have to take note of a comment by Susan Wolf,
where she prefers the …mischievousness and sense of irony in Chesterton’s

Father Brown to the innocence and undiscriminating love of St. Francis.5 Less
daunting, then, is the task of considering a heroic action rather than a
hero/heroine.

The soldier example is workable, because we do not have to

scrutinize his total character and life. Selecting his action as an example, it may
be countered, already presumes a definition that is yet to be achieved and thus
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is circular. Allowing for later revision, however, we use it here because it is
plausible and because it helps to move our question forward.
Our soldier would be praised because of his extraordinary courage and most
likely would be honored posthumously. No one would argue that this was his
duty, that it was expected of him, and that, had he not fallen on the grenade, he
should be criticized and dishonored. Oddly enough, if he had somehow survived,
he might even have pushed any praise and honor aside, with some amazing
modesty, claiming that he was “just doing his duty.” Self-sacrifice, however, was
not his duty, nor the duty of any other soldier. Neither was such an action
forbidden. The action has an extraordinarily high degree of moral excellence that
transcends any definition of duty. Here is the main feature of heroic action: it
transcends the duty of the agent.

His modest protestations notwithstanding,

Urmson’s soldier went beyond his duty when he sacrificed his life for the squad.
If heroic actions are supererogatory, and supererogatory actions go beyond
duty, then, within three ethical theories, we should be able to explain the
meaning of ‘duty’ beyond which actions become heroic.
A deontological sense comes to mind first, especially a Kantian sense, since
duty holds a uniquely dominant position for Kant. Morally good actions are good
in virtue of their status as duty: Action A has moral value only if action A is
performed as a duty. But, because we must say that our soldier did not have a
duty to sacrifice himself, we must then say that the sacrifice had no moral value.
But it did indeed have moral value, value that Kant cannot explain adequately as
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a derivative of duty. Moreover his classification of actions has trouble with the
non-obligatory. He says, for instance: An action that is neither commanded nor

forbidden is merely permissible…an action of this kind is called morally
indifferent.6 For Kant, permissible actions are morally indifferent. Whatever
actions are neither forbidden nor obligatory belong in the area of the permissible.
Accordingly Kant would say that Urmson’s soldier was permitted to fall on the
grenade. This articulation, though, does not do justice to our assessment of his
sacrifice.
either.

Heroic actions are good, not indifferent. This articulation won’t do
Kant’s range of permissible actions does not satisfy; his classification

needs to give a plausible account of permissible actions that are not morally
indifferent. This complaint, though, comes from a non-Kantian perspective, one
that can evaluate an action as good independently of a sense of duty, i.e., an
axiological sense that does not depend on a deontological. To the Kantian these
two realms are coterminous; for the non-Kantian, duty is not morally allencompassing.
Perhaps Kant was aware of the inadequacy of the meaning of ‘permissible’,
since the Metaphysic of Morals, expanding the meaning of ‘duty’,

offers a

fourfold classification of duties achieved from the conjunction of ‘self’ and
‘others’, on the one hand, and ‘perfect’ and ‘imperfect’, on the other. A perfect
duty is one that is strict, rigorous, and admits of no exceptions.

Imperfect

duties, prescriptions of general ends, do not specify any particular action with
which to achieve a general end, and an agent has some choice about how to
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fulfill imperfect duties; he has latitude over the means. Does this help to
understand heroism? Our soldier’s sacrifice is not a duty to himself, whether
perfect or imperfect.

Heroic actions are too uncommon to be perfect duties. A

prescription to cultivate one’s talents is Kant’s example of an imperfect duty to
oneself; the prescription of benevolence, an imperfect duty to others. If heroic
action has any place in a Kantian scheme, it would have to be an imperfect duty
to others. This possibility, though, would challenge or compromise a higher duty,
viz. one’s duty to oneself. Not only does a rational agent not have a perfect duty
to sacrifice himself, he has a perfect duty to maintain his own well-being. If we
were to insist that the action was morally good, the sacrificial action must be reclassified as duty. He was obliged to sacrifice himself, and, not only he, but
everyone, because the action must be open to universalizability. When
deliberating within the Categorical Imperative, one must consider whether the
maxim under scrutiny, viz. whether to sacrifice one’s life, would be conceivable in
a world governed by this law of nature. Can we conceive of a world in which
everyone has a duty to sacrifice himself? Such a prospect seems, on the face of
it, strange. A more plausible reading of Kant would hold that there is no such
duty, and that the duty of self-preservation is pre-eminent. We are encouraged
too by his strong statements against suicide; even while suicide and self-sacrifice
are different, they are similar as challenges to a duty of self-preservation.
The soldier’s sacrifice, deontologically, is morally good only if it is his duty. He
must understand this action to be his duty and have the moral motive of doing
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his duty. While a deontological theory derives moral goodness from a concept of
duty, Utilitarian theory presents the opposite, viz. that duty is derived from
goodness. Action A is a duty, only if action A is good (useful, pleasant). To a
Utilitarian, judgments of moral goodness are independent of, and prior to,
determination of duty. Duty is dependent on utility. What is morally ‘good’,
though, is extensive, since the useful and the pleasant are included, and so it
becomes necessary for a Utilitarian to restrict the realm of ‘goodness’ so as to
determine where duty lies.
The soldier’s sacrifice is probably useful for maintaining numbers of persons
in the military; while one soldier is dead more have survived to fight another day.
The episode would probably be useful also for teaching the squad how to handle
live grenades safely. Envisioning consequences, though, is an impossibly long
task bedeviled by a realization that one can never know enough. The squad may
have survived, but the consequences for the soldier’s wife, children, and aging
parents cannot be excluded from deliberation. Even if we put aside, for now,
this question of which useful consequences are to be counted, consequentialism
cannot discriminate among the many consequences so as to demarcate those
that are duty from those that are not. All useful consequences cannot be a
matter of duty, for some principle of discrimination should be available, if we are
to derive what is duty from what is ‘good’ (useful, pleasant). The question is
rendered moot, though, by the idealism and spontaneity of the soldier’s sacrifice.
Utilitarianism cannot draw the line between what is duty and what is
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supererogatory, after the fact, just as the soldier at that one crucial moment did
not.
We are thus brought to the question of the differentiation of duty and the
locus of the differentiating. If he were somehow to survive and modestly protest
that he was just doing his duty, the community would override his protestation.
Community assessment would seem to be a factor. Citizens expect firemen and
policemen, like soldiers, to put their lives in jeopardy, and actions like rushing
into burning buildings and dodging gunfire are seen as part of their respective
job descriptions. If such actions are their duty, then, by definition, such brave
actions cannot qualify as supererogatory. Yet, these same actions require a level
of courage and commitment that cannot be considered ordinary. To the extent
that the community sees these actions as duty, to that extent the actions are not
heroic.

Contrariwise firemen at Ground Zero on September 11, 2001 were

acclaimed as heroes. What seems to make the difference is the community’s
interpretation of the action, an interpretation that, in the case of our soldier,
trumps both the objective qualities of the actions and the intention of the agent.
Community judgment, however, does not seem enough; while it may be
involved, it is not sufficient.

What if the agent himself interprets his action as

life-threatening and still undertakes it for the good of another person? We can
imagine a community that thinks little of an individual member’s heroic efforts.
Even if this were the case, community opinion aside, such an agent, in
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summoning internal resources and idealistic resolve, is doing what for him is
heroic. Agent intention, then, makes a difference.
Unless and until he would tell us otherwise, the soldier acted freely and
autonomously, his sacrificial action embodying an idealism and a special regard
for the community of his squad. We would disagree that doing so was his duty.
His action was morally excellent but completely optional. What is indicated here,
then, is that the Utilitarian tie between ‘good’ and ‘obligatory’ is not analytic, and
that, if we would join the ‘good’ and the ‘obligatory’, we must provide normative
justification.
Justification rests, I suggest, on the autonomy of the person, specifically, on
his freedom to pursue his own life goals according to his own ideals. While some
duties will be imposed by the community on the individual, these externallyimposed duties are lesser in value and in obligation to the duties that the
autonomous person places on himself. A citizen has duties imposed on him by
members of his community, who, in turn, have a right to his obedience. The
duty-right correlation created by externally-imposed duties does not exist,
though, in the case of self-imposed duties. No one has a right to expect or
demand someone else’s self-sacrifice. The famous opening paragraphs of Mill’s

On Liberty, for instance, recognize and even demand full sovereignty over one’s
body and mind. With full sovereignty or autonomy a given, any duty to sacrifice
oneself can originate only in the individual agent, as a self-imposed duty. Oddly
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enough, then, any modest protestation by the soldier that he was just doing his
duty has a degree of truth, i.e. it was a self-imposed duty.
It is on this point that an anti-supererogationist may raise a question about
the origin of one’s sense of duty, as Gregory Mellema points out in his 1992
study of supererogation with the example of Kurt Waldheim. It was revealed in
1988 that Waldheim, then President of Austria, had been a Wehrmacht officer
from 1942 to 1945. Though aware of Nazi atrocities in Greece and Yugoslavia,
he made no attempt to stop them. Addressing the Austrian people, he asked for
understanding for all those who, like himself, did not resist the evil:

Yes, I admit I wanted to survive by following
orders…I have the deepest respect for all those
who resisted. But I ask understanding for all
the hundreds of thousands who didn’t do that,
but nonetheless did not become personally guilty. 7
By implication, resistance to Nazi atrocities was morally superior to nonresistance, yet, while resistance was heroic and deserves praise, non-resistance
does not deserve blame.

Rather there should be understanding of the vast

number who did not resist.

One view of this question, that of an anti-

supererogationist, is that an agent deserves blame when he does not take up a
morally superior task as his duty. The argument would be that, once an action is
recognized as morally superior, then this recognition brings obligation to
perform.

An opposite view is what we are calling supererogation:

the non-

resisters did not take up the morally superior position, for they did not see this
action as their duty. Resistance was morally superior but not a moral obligation.
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What of a failure to perform one’s recognized and assumed duties? Are there
sanctions of any kind? All persons have social, professional, and personal roles
that impose duties, and other persons, having the right to expect the
performance, may impose sanctions for non-performance.

Non-performance

deserves sanctions, ranging from mild, informal criticism all the way to formal,
severe punishment. Sanctions against Person A are appropriate only if Person B
has a right to A’s duty-performance. In a situation where A has imposed a duty
on himself, B, having no right to A’s duty-performance, has no justification in
punishing A. Urmson’s soldier, if he had a duty in any sense of the word, had a
self-imposed duty, one that only he could know of, and one that he
autonomously took upon himself.
The question of whether this duty was morally good raises again the
connection made by the Utilitarian between the good and the obligatory, but
from the opposite direction.

The Utilitarian, envisioning many desirable

outcomes and presuming that the achieving of these must be someone’s duty,
must decide which of these is one that he himself must perform. In the case of
a self-imposed duty, the determination of what is obligatory being made, its
justification as good should be clear to the agent. Understanding the soldier’s
sacrifice as self-imposed, we receive some help from the Utilitarian. The sacrifice
saved the lives of a squad of soldiers at the price of just one. The soldier’s
family notwithstanding, the Utilitarian’s hedonic calculus should approve.

In

addition there is intrinsic value to the act itself, as well as in its outcome.
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Safeguarding human life is an ethical principle of the highest order, and the
many laws, rules and policies that apply this principle are the duties of the
soldier-as-citizen. His sacrifice is related to, and continuous with, these duties,
yet goes conspicuously beyond them. Heyd writes, “…supererogation should be

characterized as realizing more of the same type of value attached to obligatory
action…there is a common and continuous scale of values shared by
supererogation and duty.” 8
Because the soldier acted autonomously, his action was voluntary. Had he
acted in fulfillment of an external, imposed duty, there is always the possibility
that he would have acted in order to avoid punishment. But, the origin of this
duty being himself, his action is voluntary and his motive uncorrupted. He might
have acted otherwise, e.g. run away, accepted death without taking action. His
intention was altruistic, meaning that he stood to gain nothing by this action for
himself, and his death clearly benefited his comrades.
The third great normative tradition, Virtue Ethics, is less able to
accommodate heroism.

This inability is ironic, in that courage is one of

Aristotle’s prime examples of a moral virtue.

One of the basic tenets of the

Nicomachean Ethics is that virtue is a well-entrenched disposition, or a stable
equilibrium, a state of one’s character, and that a virtuous action lies at the
mean between extremes of excess and deficiency. Supererogatory actions do not
lie at a mean but are defined by their departure from the mean. If the doctrine
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of the mean is correct, then supererogatory actions, inasmuch as they lie outside
the mean, can never be virtuous.
Moreover, there is a unity among the various virtues, such that, to have one
in full measure, a person must have other virtues as well. The virtue of courage,
for instance, requires the virtue of perseverance.

Accordingly an observer

cannot attribute virtue to an agent on the basis of a single action. Did Urmson’s
soldier possess Aristotelian virtue? Observers cannot say that he was virtuous,
because they have seen only a single action and have no way of perceiving and
interpreting his character.
Judgments about character or virtue are determinants of what is good, or,
moral rightness and goodness are understood in terms of character of virtue.
Throwing one’s body onto a grenade in order to save the lives of one’s comrades
would be virtuous if and only if such actions were characteristically or typically
performed by a virtuous person. We are left without any way of deciding who
would qualify as a virtuous person without lapsing into circularity, for we would
wish to propose the soldier as such a virtuous person, but, according to Aristotle,
we cannot do so. Even virtuous persons must perform morally neutral actions, or
must take actions now and then based on incomplete or wrong information.
Even virtuous persons must make mistakes. When, exactly, would this virtuous
person be an exemplar for lesser mortals in their deliberation? Even if we were
to put this impediment aside, and even if we could agree on how to assess the
total character of the virtuous person, we would have to admit that the standard
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of rightness or goodness has been set too high and there is no space for the
supererogatory. How can anyone move beyond Aristotle’s virtuous person? We
seem to need a criterion of rightness or goodness before we look up to Aristotle’s
virtuous person.
Urmson, then, was right in predicting that consequentialism would be more
accommodating to heroism than deontology would be, and, a fortiori, than virtue
ethics. The consequences of heroism for the “greatest happiness of the greatest
number” are fairly obvious, and, from these consequences, duties will be derived
and taken up. What counts as duty is a constantly moving realm, reflecting the
whole range of human knowledge, needs, goals, and values in a community.
Amidst this human flux, the heroic action is both constant and variable:
constant, in that it always springs from an agent’s generosity and creativity;
variable, in that its unpredictable content or character changes to meet the
needs of the moment. Heroic actions have a contextual character. Dorothy Day,
for instance, responded to the poor in New York City; Father Kolbe, to the misery
of a fellow prisoner in a death camp. They met varied needs in varied times and
places. In moving well beyond what was required, they signaled to a community
of observers a range of possibilities, beyond law, beyond public policy, beyond
duty.
In a nation of laws like ours, heroic acts seem both necessary and
improbable. Heroic acts need duty as a point of reference, in that the heroic, by
definition, moves beyond what is required as duty. As are all his fellow citizens,
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the hero is forbidden from taking the life of another person and is forbidden too
from harming others. Most people manage this much. A hero, however, will
emerge, occasionally, who moves far beyond this measure of non-murder and
non-harm into a moral frontier land. Here he takes conspicuously generous
action in advancing the interests of others and of preserving their lives, perhaps
at the expense of his own interests, well-being or life. Heroic actions lie on the
same scale of value as duty, but surpass it. Heroism is continuous with duty and
yet it stands for a moral creativity. The hero stands at the growing edge of what
the community sees as good, the point at which duties end, the point at which
his own moral creativity envisions that more is still possible for him, if not for the
rest of us. The hero, in short, “pushes the envelope” of society’s values.
Heroic acts stand at the juncture of individual action and group identity.
Ulysses is not a hero for us, because we no longer need what he has to offer.
Oddly, what counts as heroic keeps changing as the realm of duty expands.
Unlike the non-fulfillment of duties, the absence of heroic acts cannot be blamed,
criticized or punished. The heroic action has its origin in the individual, yet it
benefits the community.

It cannot be required, although it is essential to

community survival, being valued as paradigmatic and as part of the education
of the young. Doing one’s duty brings some benefits to the agent, but heroic
acts may or may not. They may in fact destroy the hero.
Our intuitions tell us that there are actions that are heroic, and we want to
take up Urmson’s challenge to account for the heroic in secular ethical theory.
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Yoram Lubling, writing recently in Contemporary Philosophy, claims the following
about theory:

Theorizing is always a form of practice or a
dramatic rehearsal in the imagination…theory
in general…will amount to nothing more than
an Ivory Tower exercise in concept splitting
or merely a display of oratory skills or
persuasion. 9
He may be right at times, but theory, at other times, allows us to sort things out.
We need now and again to render life rational, to articulate, to communicate, to
achieve consensus, to defend, to urge, to educate the young.
especially ethical theory, helps reduce the level of babble.

And theory,

With regard to

heroism, if ethical theory can help us to clarify, in any way, the difference
between a Kurt Waldheim on the one hand and a Maximilian Kolbe on the other,
we should try it. Results are sometimes murky, but they are results.
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